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I. INTRODUCTION
As a general rule, design features that are considered functional are not
protected under the Lanham Act because they are: (1) essential to the use or
purpose of the product; or (2) serve some form of competitive necessity.1
However, the doctrine of aesthetic functionality has evolved to protect
certain functional elements that are aesthetic, such as color, if the use of
that color meets certain criteria.2 The test for whether a design element,
including color, can be trademarked involves a four part analysis, inquiring
whether the feature: (1) is essential to the use and/or purpose of the
product; (2) affects the cost and/or quality of the product; (3) significantly
impacts competition; and, (4) has secondary meaning.3
Ever since the Supreme Court decided in Qualitex v. Jacobson Products
1. See Traffix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2001)
(clarifying that a comprehensive definition of functionality includes the tests laid out in
Inwood and Qualitex).
2. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-66 (1995)
(explaining that because color can identify a brand name without serving some
additional function, it too, like words or designs, can meet the basic legal requirement
for use as a trademark).
3. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169 (examining whether color that serves a nonfunctional purpose interferes with market competition); Inwood Labs. V. Ives Labs,
456 U.S. 844, 856-57 (1952) (evaluating whether mislabeling a generic drug with the
brand name affects whether people use and purchase it); Christian Louboutin S.A. v.
Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 224 (2d Cir. 2012) (asserting that
color is capable of acquiring a secondary meaning and identifying the brand name).
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that color can qualify as a trademark, just like a word or design, lower
courts have struggled to identify the types of circumstances under which
color can serve as a trademark.4 Several of the cases examining the
protectability of color, however, have focused on the four-part test to
analyze the presence of color on a product and its effect on the use, price,
market, and overall character of the product.5
In May and September 2012, the Sixth and Second Circuits applied this
four-part test to grant trademark protection to the red wax seal on Maker’s
Mark bourbon bottles and the red soles on French fashion designer
Christian Louboutin’s (“Louboutin”) high-end shoes.6 In 2013, the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) addressed the question of
whether a florist company could trademark the color black.7 The TTAB’s
decision to deny Florists’ Transworld Delivery (“FTD”) a trademark for the
color black was a federal court’s first attempt at applying the four-step
analysis following the landmark Maker’s Mark and Louboutin case.8
Unfortunately, the TTAB misapplied the test, leaving unanswered
questions for other courts, and possibly the Supreme Court, to address.9
While courts have struggled to identify the circumstances in which color
can be trademarked, the recent Maker’s Mark and Louboutin decisions
appear to settle upon a useful analysis.10 This Comment argues that in
FTD, the TTAB ignored this standard by denying the trademark simply on
the basis that black was functional, and did not engage in a full secondary
meaning analysis.11 Part II examines the history of trademark protection
for single colors and the four-part test for analyzing trademark

4. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163 (explaining that there is no obvious reason why
color on a product cannot also express secondary meaning).
5. See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 224-28 (applying the four part test to decide
whether red can be protected in the fashion industry).
6. See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 213 (explaining that informed consumers instantly
associate the red sole with the Louboutin brand); Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v.
Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 420 (6th Cir.) (explaining that the red wax seal was
instantly recognizable as part of Maker’s Mark’s identity).
7. See In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1785
(T.T.A.B. 2013) (describing the purported unique mark as black floral packaging).
8. See generally Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 206.
9. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1792 (applying the competition prong to a broad market
and ignoring the secondary meaning prong of the four-part test for color protection).
10. See, e.g., Maker’s Mark Distillery, 679 F.3d at 421 (agreeing with the district
court that red dripping wax seal has acquired secondary meaning); Louboutin, 696 F.3d
at 227-28 (holding that the case turns on secondary meaning).
11. See infra Part III (arguing that color in certain contexts has secondary meaning
because color can identify brand).
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infringement claims involving color.12 Part III argues that the TTAB did
not correctly apply the test when it decided that the color black could not
be trademarked without even engaging in a full secondary meaning
analysis, which is the last step in evaluating a trademark infringement
claim.13 Part IV offers a policy argument that advocates for more
stringently applying the four-part test in order to clarify the circumstances
under which color can be trademarked.14 Part V concludes that the TTAB
should reexamine the FTD case and fully analyze the color black in a way
that is consistent with the analysis in Maker’s Mark and Louboutin.15
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Color Trademarks
1. Pre-Qualitex
Prior to the adoption of the Lanham Act, the principal statutory
framework governing trademarks in the United States, very few courts
addressed the issue of whether color could be trademarked; thus the courts’
posture towards color trademarks was ambiguous.16 It was not until 1945
in Yellow Cab Transit v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer—when the Sixth
Circuit decided that the yellow color on taxicabs was sufficiently
recognizable to be given some protection—did courts began to recognize
how color could identify a brand in certain contexts.17 Still however, it was
not until after the passage of the Lanham Act that the courts rejected the
idea that color alone is never subject to trademark protection.18
The issue of whether color could be trademarked, however, remained
relatively inactive until 1985 when the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit was faced with the question of whether a fiberglass
manufacturer could trademark the pink color of its insulation in In re
12. See infra Part II (outlining the history and modern approach to color analysis).
13. See infra Part III (arguing that TTAB did not complete its analysis because it

neglected to apply the six factor test).
14. See infra Part IV (explaining that even if the outcome in the FTD case was
right, the analysis was wrong).
15. See infra Part V (concluding that the unclear analysis in FTD only further
emphasizes the need for clarification).
16. See A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S.
166, 170-71 (1906) (casting doubt on the possibility that color can be trademarked).
17. See Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 147 F.2d
407, 415 (6th Cir. 1945) (holding that the yellow color on taxicabs is unique enough to
have secondary meaning).
18. See, e.g., Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co., 512 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (W.D.Pa. 1981)
(protecting the plaintiff’s color arrangement on metal spacers).
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Owens-Corning Fiberglass.19 The Federal Circuit held that the color of the
pink insulation was distinctive and allowed the manufacturer, OwensCorning Fiberglass, to register its trademark.20
2. Qualitex and Beyond
In 1995, the question of whether color could be trademarked finally
reached the Supreme Court.21 In Qualitex v. Jacobson Products, Qualitex,
used green-gold dry cleaning press pads, and its competitor, Jacobson
Products, began selling similarly colored pads.22 The Supreme Court, in
reversing the lower court’s decision, held that color was not ineligible for
trademark protection.23 Furthermore, the Court was careful to observe that
color can identify a product and serve something other than a functional
purpose.24 The decision in Qualitex was the Supreme Court’s official
imprimatur on color trademarks, representing its general willingness to
accept that color in the right context can be trademarked.25
B. Trademark Infringement Under The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act gives trademark owners the opportunity to register their
trademarks, thereby granting the owner of the mark the right to prevent
others from using it.26 The primary purpose of trademark protection is to
ensure that the public knows who created a product, and that the trademark

19. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206,
218 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that the issue of single color mark registration lay idle until
1985).
20. See In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1122 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (reasoning that there is no public policy interest in preventing the color pink
from receiving protection).
21. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 160-61 (1995)
(questioning whether the Lanham Act permits the registration of a trademark consisting
only of a color).
22. See id. at 161 (granting certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit Decision that
color alone can never be trademarked).
23. See id. at 171-72 (reasoning that if the Lanham Act permits an ordinary word
to be trademarked logic dictates that this rule would apply to colors as well).
24. See id. at 164 (explaining that it is difficult to find a per se rule precluding the
use of color as a trademark).
25. See id. at 170 (explaining that the “ultimate test” for extending trademark
protection to a color is whether recognizing the feature would significantly impact
competition).
26. See LANHAM ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining a trademark as “any word,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” which a person has an intention
to use in commerce and registers to identify her product from those sold by others).
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owner can benefit from building her brand’s reputation.27 Trademark law,
unlike patent and copyright law, however, does not give a producer
monopoly over a particular product.28
Trademark infringement claims are analyzed according to: (1) whether
the trademark merits protection; and (2) whether the competing mark is
likely to cause consumer confusion.29 Even if the mark merits protection,
and the alleged infringement causes consumer confusion, the plaintiff still
cannot prevail if the mark is deemed functional.30 The functionality of a
mark can be demonstrated through either utilitarian functionality or
aesthetic functionality.31
C. The Affirmative Defenses to Trademark Infringement: Utilitarian
Functionality and Aesthetic Functionality
As the Supreme Court mentioned in Qualitex, functional features on a
product generally cannot be trademarked.32 There are two types of
functionality, utilitarian and aesthetic, and both the utilitarian and aesthetic
functionality doctrines prevent the owner of a trademark from having a
monopoly on a particular product.33
1. The Traditional Approach: Utilitarian Functionality
A feature is considered functional in the utilitarian sense if it affects how

27. See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64 (explaining that trademark protection
tells consumers who produced a product while also helping to guarantee that the
producer will benefit monetarily from her creation).
28. See Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 115 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that trademark law is less about innovation and more about preserving a
competitive market for the benefit of consumers).
29. See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Burke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115 (2d
Cir. 2006) (explaining that in the two step analysis courts evaluate the mark’s
distinction and whether defendant’s use of the mark has confused consumers).
30. See, e.g., Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 58, 59 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1995) (noting in dictum that functional features can only be protected through the
patent system, which provides a monopoly over a design feature for only a limited
amount of time).
31. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696
F.3d 206, 219 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that both utilitarian and aesthetic functionality
can serve as affirmative defenses to trademark infringement claims).
32. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (providing in example that if a special shaped
light bulb is shaped that way to enhance illumination the shape of the light bulb is
functional and therefore cannot be trademarked).
33. See, e.g., Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 145 n.5
(2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that unlike patent law, trademark law is not meant to grant
trademark owners a monopoly on production).
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the product is used or affects the cost of the product.34 There are four
factors, the Morton Norwich Factors, that courts generally rely on when
evaluating whether the purpose or cost of the product is affected: (1) does a
utility patent exist; (2) do advertisements highlight the design’s utilitarian
advantages; (3) are there available alternative designs; and, (4) does the
design simplify manufacturing.35 In Traffix Devices v. Marketing Displays,
the Supreme Court examined the concept of utilitarian functionality.36
Specifically, a manufacturer of road signs alleged that a mechanism it
created and patented to keep the signs upright in strong winds also had
secondary meaning, such that consumers associated the look of the
mechanism with the company, Marketing Displays (MD).37 While the
springs were a unique patented component of the sign, the Court decided
that registering the spring as a trademark would be inappropriate because
the springs were clearly made to affect how the design worked, not how it
looked.38 In other words, the alleged trademark was a functional part of the
product configuration, and therefore could not be protected under the
Lanham Act.39
2. The Highly Fact-Specific Approach: Aesthetic Functionality
Generally, when a design is deemed functional in the two-pronged
utilitarian sense and affects: (1) the use of the product; and (2) the cost of
the product, there is no need to continue the analysis.40 In contrast, when
examining the aesthetic design of a product, such as color, a mark may still
be deemed functional if it significantly impacts competition.41 In other
words, under the aesthetic functionality doctrine, if a design feature is
essential to the purpose of a product, or affects its cost or quality, then the
34. See In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1788
(T.T.A.B. 2013) (paraphrasing the two prongs of the Inwood test).
35. See In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (C.C.P.A.
1982) (applying the test to the factors in the case).
36. See Traffix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (concluding
that trade dress protection cannot be applied when a design is deemed functional).
37. See id. at 26 (explaining that MD brought suit under the Lanham Act against
Traffix for trademark infringement based on the copied dual spring design).
38. See id. at 30 (concluding that the trademark claim was barred because MD did
not overcome the strong presumption of functionality based on the dual-spring design
being a formerly protected patent).
39. See id. at 26 (explaining that consumers clearly did not associate the look of
the dual-spring design with MD).
40. See id. at 33 (explaining that if both portions of the bi-part Inwood test are
satisfied, asking whether there is a competitive necessity for the feature is irrelevant).
41. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (adding
to the general rule precluding registration on the basis of utilitarian functionality).
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design feature is considered functional and it will not be protected.42 But,
if a design element is not functional under the traditional two-pronged test,
the applicant must still show that protecting the feature does not have a
significant impact on competition in order to receive trademark
protection.43 In British Seagull v. Brunswick an engine manufacturing
company attempted to trademark the color black.44 In its decision, the
Federal Circuit stated that the eligibility for trademark protection turned on
the effect the design would have on competition.45 The court found that
there was a competitive need for engine manufacturers to use the color
black on outboard engines; color compatibility with boats and the ability to
make the engine look smaller.46 Similarly, the Federal Circuit focused on
competitive need in L.D. Kichler v. Davoil, in which the court found that
using a brick finish on the back of lighting fixtures constituted a
competitive need.47 Finally, in Dippin Dots v. Frosty Bites, Dippin Dots
argued that the color and shape of its ice cream beads were non-functional
because Frosty Bites could still compete in the ice cream market by serving
soft-serve ice cream without the Dippin Dot bead component and thus
would not infringe upon its trademark.48
In cases involving a claim of aesthetic functionality, the analysis is
complicated because it is difficult to distinguish between a merely
decorative design feature and one distinct enough to identify the source of
the product.49 In a recent Seventh Circuit case, Clemens Franek, the
creator and trademark owner of the circular beach towel sought to enjoin
Jay Franco & Sons, a distributor of bedding and beach accessories from
42. See id. (explaining that a feature is functional if it affects the use or cost of the
product).
43. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Colum Cascade Co., 70 F.3d 251, 253 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that a prerequisite for determining that a design is aesthetically
functional is a finding that it is essential to effective market competition).
44. See British Seagull Ltd. v. Brunswick Co., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197, 1
(T.T.A.B. 1993) (explaining that the purported mark consists of the color black as
applied to the entire outside of an outboard boat engine).
45. See id. at 2, 7.
46. See id. at 2 (noting that the prevalent use of black on outboard engines points
to a competitive need to use the color black within that market).
47. See L.D. Kichler v. Davoil, 192 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
48. See Dippin Dots, Inc. v. Frost Bites Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203
n.7 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that ice cream beads are in a different market than
traditional soft serve ice cream).
49. See Alexandra J. Schultz, Comment, Looks Can Be Deceiving: Aesthetic
Functionality in Louboutin and Beyond, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 261, 256
(2012) (explaining that in aesthetic functionality cases, courts must determine whether
an aesthetic feature of a product is merely ornamental).
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selling its own brand of round beach towels.50 In this case, the Seventh
Circuit focused on the usefulness of the circular design whereby sunbathers
are able to rotate on the towel without getting up to reposition.51 Because
of this practical characteristic, the Seventh Circuit found the design
functional under the doctrine of aesthetic functionality.52
In W.T. Rogers v. Keene, the Seventh Circuit illustrated the concept of
aesthetic functionality using a football to explain that the shape of the
football itself could not be trademarked because it is an inherent feature
and therefore functional.53 The shape of a football is aesthetically
functional because it is an element that all brands of footballs share, and
therefore has a significant effect on competition within the football
market.54 Because granting the trademark would effectively prevent others
from making footballs, the court found the shape functional and not eligible
for trademark protection.55 The issue of what types of features should be
classified as competitively necessary, and those that are merely ornamental
in nature has been litigated extensively.56
3. The Relationship Between Aesthetic Functionality and Secondary
Meaning
To register a trademark, a designer must demonstrate that a design
feature is non-functional or that it is distinct enough to identify a brand
through secondary meaning.57 In Morton-Norwich Products, the appellant
50. See Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 856 (explaining that in
1994 Franek trademarked the circular beach towel and when settlement negotiations
fell through with Jay Franco & Son he filed a lawsuit for trademark infringement).
51. See id. at 859, 861 (explaining that Franek should have pursued a design patent
and not a trademark).
52. See id. at 859 (holding that Franek would have a strong competitive advantage
if allowed to trademark the circular towel).
53. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (explaining
that a functional feature is something so intrinsic to the product that the designer must
design around that feature).
54. See id. (explaining that the shape of the football is not designed to differentiate
the brands, like a logo).
55. See id. (explaining that the football’s oval shape is functional because it is
found in all brands of football).
56. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc.,
696 F.3d 206, 228 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that red on the bottom of Louboutin’s shoes
can be protected); Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc. 679 F.3d 410,
418 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the red wax on Maker’s Mark bottles is not functional
and therefore trademark protected); In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc. 106
U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1792 (T.T.A.B. 2013) (holding that black floral packaging is not
functional).
57. See In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A.
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sought to register a glass container as a trademark, and the trademark
examiner rejected the action on the basis that the design was not distinct
and therefore functional.58 On appeal, the court acknowledged that the
trademark examiner intertwined the issues of functionality and secondary
meaning.59
The court emphasized that secondary meaning and
functionality must be evaluated separately.60
There are four parts to the test for color protection, but one of these
factors is secondary meaning, which includes six sub-parts.61 In Louboutin,
the Second Circuit listed six factors relevant to determining whether a
design feature has secondary meaning: (1) advertising expenses; (2)
consumer studies linking the purported mark to the source; (3) media
coverage of the product; (4) sales success; (5) attempts at plagiarism; and
(6) length of time the mark has been used.62
D. The Four-Part Test: Purpose, Price, Competition, and Character
The circumstances under which color can be successfully registered as a
trademark has been particularly unclear.63 The few cases that have
addressed this issue, however, have relied on the four-part color protection
test, and, if necessary, the six-part test for secondary meaning.64 Three
recent cases demonstrate the application of these tests with varying
outcomes: Maker’s Mark Distillery v. Diageo, Louboutin v. Yves Saint
Laurent, and In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery.65
In the May 2012, Maker’s Mark Distillery, Maker’s Mark, a bourbon
1982) (emphasizing that both of these requirements must be kept separate from each
other).
58. See id. at 1334-35 (noting that the examiner repeatedly emphasized that the
container was a “non-distinctive purely functional container.”).
59. See id. at 1343 (explaining that a non-distinctive design does not necessarily
mean it is a functional design).
60. See id. at 1335, 1344.
61. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696
F.3d 206, 226 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that the six factor test helps resolve the crucial
question of whether the source of a product influences buyers to purchase that product).
62. See id. (listing the six-part test as a method for determining what motivates
consumers to purchase a product).
63. See, e.g., id.
64. See id. (asserting that color is capable of acquiring secondary meaning and
identifying a brand).
65. See id. at 228 (holding that Louboutin’s red sole mark could be trademarked);
Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc. 679 F.3d 410, 424 (6th Cir. 2012)
(holding that the Maker’s Mark red wax seal could be trademarked); In re Florists’
Transworld Delivery, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1792 (T.T.A.B. 2013) (holding that the
color black on floral packaging was functional).
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distillery, accused Diageo, a tequila company, of trademark infringement
contending that the seal that Diageo placed on its tequila products strongly
resembled the Maker’s Mark’s red wax seal.66 Diageo argued that the seal
was functional and therefore could not be protected. The Sixth Circuit held,
however, that the red wax was part of Maker’s Mark’s identity and
therefore protected.67 The court did not uphold the aesthetic functionality
defense.68 Running through the purpose, cost, and competition analysis,
the court emphasized that red wax was not the only wax and color that
could be used to seal the bottle, and that competing companies were not
placed at a significant disadvantage when prevented from using red wax.69
Five months later, in Louboutin, the Second Circuit upheld trademark
protection for the red lacquered outer sole on Louboutin’s high-end
footwear.70 At the time of the decision, Louboutin had been producing
shoes featuring a red outer sole for about two decades.71 Appearing
regularly on celebrities and icons in the fashion industry, Louboutin
obtained a trademark for the well-known red soles in 2008.72 In 2011,
competing fashion designer, Yves Saint Laurent (“YSL”) began making a
monochromatic red shoe with a similar red sole.73 After several attempts to
discuss the monochrome red shoe, and YSL’s refusal to withdraw the
model from the market, Louboutin asserted a claim against YSL under the
Lanham Act.74 In 2012, the Second Circuit, held on appeal that there was
no rule preventing color from serving as a trademark in the fashion industry
66. See Maker’s Mark Distillery, 679 F.3d at 415 (describing the trademark in
question as a seal made from red dripping wax).
67. See id. at 420 (noting that the lower court was correct in its finding of
uniqueness).
68. See id. at 418, 424 (concluding that there is a likelihood of confusion between
Maker’s red wax seal and Diageo’s red wax seal).
69. See id. at 422-23 (finding that the strength of the trademark in identifying
Maker’s Mark bourbon renders it non-functional).
70. See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 227 (holding that the District Court’s conclusion
that a single color can never serve as a trademark was based on an incorrect
understanding of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality and that the mark had
developed secondary meaning).
71. See id. at 213 (explaining that the red sole mark is instantly recognizable to
informed consumers as Louboutin’s handiwork).
72. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d
445, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (introducing that within the actual trademark application
the mark is described as a lacquered red sole on footwear).
73. See id. at 448 (describing the shoe in question as the “Tribute,” belonging to
YSL’s 2011 and 2008 Cruise collections, appearing in stores in November of each
year).
74. See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 213.
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and that Louboutin’s red sole mark, when limited to uses in which the red
outer sole contrasts with the color of the remainder of the shoe, carried a
secondary meaning and was a protected mark.75 In other words, when a red
sole is placed on an all red shoe, there is no trademark protection.76 In
reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit, focused first on the final step
of the four-part test and introduced several of the factors relevant to
determining secondary meaning, as well as extensive evidence of
Louboutin’s advertising expenditures, media coverage, and sales success.77
In finding that Louboutin’s red sole mark had secondary meaning, there
was no need for the court to engage in a full assessment under the aesthetic
functionality doctrine, as even if something is functional, if it has
secondary meaning, it is still eligible for trademark protection.78
After Louboutin, it seemed that the test for color analysis was settled, but
in March 2013, the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (TTAB) was
presented with the question of whether the color black could be
trademarked in In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery.79 The TTAB
evaluated the color under the four-part test, assessing the purpose, price,
competitive market, and acquired meaning of the product feature, and
affirmed the trademark examiner’s decision that black is functional because
of a strong competitive need to use black in the floral industry to convey
particular messages.80 The TTAB briefly addressed the secondary meaning
portion of the analysis and concluded that black lacked secondary meaning,
emphasizing that a single color mark can never be distinctive, and
apparently ignoring the Qualitex decision in which the Supreme Court
made it clear that color in the right context, just like a word or design, can
be trademarked.81 Moreover, because a finding of functionality does not
75. See id. at 228 (holding that the District Court’s conclusion that a single color
can never serve as a trademark was based on an incorrect understanding of the doctrine
of aesthetic functionality and that the mark had developed secondary meaning).
76. See id. at 227 (reasoning that Louboutin’s red sole mark is closely associated
with contrast).
77. See id. at 225-26 (emphasizing that the red sole of the shoe was instantly
recognized in high-end commercial markets and social circles).
78. See id. at 228 (holding that it would be “axiomatic” to evaluate the likelihood
of confusion and functionality under the aesthetic functionality doctrine after a finding
of secondary meaning).
79. See In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1785
(T.T.A.B. 2013) (describing the purported unique mark as black floral packaging).
80. See id. at 1792 (concluding that the applicant did not defeat the prima facie
case of functionality established by the examining attorney and that the mark is
functional).
81. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co, 514 U.S. 159, 162-66 (1995)
(explaining that because color can identify a brand name without serving some
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preclude registration if the purported mark has secondary meaning, the
TTAB applied the test incorrectly in the FTD case.82
III. ANALYSIS
A. Because Maker’s Mark And Louboutin Were Decided Within A Few
Months Of Each Other, And Apply Similar Four-Part Tests, The TTAB In
FTD Should Have Followed The Maker’s Mark And Louboutin Precedent.
Qualitex affirmed that there is no rule preventing color from being
trademarked but remained silent how to determine whether a particular
color is eligible for protection.83 Since Qualitex, when evaluating aesthetic
features, including color, courts have taken a highly fact-specific
approach.84 Lacking guidance from the Supreme Court, for several
decades, the lower courts have attempted to differentiate the best way to
analyze color under the various tests for varying circumstances.85 For
instance, courts have attempted to delineate between satisfactory and
unsatisfactory industries, occasionally finding that the nature of the
business precludes trademark registration for color.86
The trial court in Louboutin precluded single color trademarking in the
fashion industry, holding that color in the context of fashion is functional.87
The reasoning behind the ruling was that if single colors in the fashion
additional function, it too, like words or designs, can meet the basic legal requirement
for use as a trademark).
82. See In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A.
1982) (emphasizing that functionality and secondary meaning must be analyzed
separately).
83. See Qualitex at 174 (holding only that color may sometimes meet the basic
legal requirements for trademark protection, but not elaborating on the circumstances
under which these requirements could be satisfied)
84. Compare Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410,
417-24 (6th Cir. 2012) (conducting a fact specific analysis under both the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality and the Frisch Test), with Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek,
615 F.3d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 2010) (conducting a fact specific analysis under the
aesthetic functionality doctrine).
85. See Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 222 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that because branding success is difficult to
distinguish, the aesthetic functionality doctrine is highly fact specific).
86. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F.
Supp. 2d 445, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (reasoning that if Louboutin was granted a
trademark for the color red, there would be no end to the colors that could be
trademarked in the fashion world).
87. See id. (reasoning that color is such a major part of fashion that the Lanham
Act could never accommodate the “broad spectrum” of claims that would inevitably
arise from single color trademarks in the industry).
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industry could be trademarked, then courts would be inundated with
applications for trademark protection.88 However, in Maker’s Mark and
Louboutin, the courts begin to move towards a standard analysis for
trademarking color, and then the TTAB, in the first application of the
standardized test after the landmark Louboutin decision breaks from
precedent.89
In Maker’s Mark and Louboutin on appeal, the test for whether color
could be trademarked involved a four-part analysis, that assessed whether
the color was essential to the purpose and affected the cost of the product,
and also significantly impacted competition and the overall character or
meaning of the product.90 The factors then relevant for determining
whether a design feature had acquired secondary meaning included:
advertising expenditures; consumer study reports; media coverage details;
product sales revenue; plagiarism attempts; and the length of time the
market had been in use.91 Maker’s Mark dealt with the first two prongs of
aesthetic functionality and offered a detailed analysis of the competition
theory of functionality, finding that there was a likelihood of consumer
confusion between Maker’s Mark’s red wax seal and the Diageo seal.92 In
Louboutin, the court found the red soles to be functional under the
competitive prong of the four-part test, and then focused heavily on the
secondary meaning analysis.93
In FTD, the TTAB applied the correct test, evaluating purpose, price,
competition, and secondary meaning, but incorrectly found that because
black was functional, a secondary meaning analysis was not necessary.94
88. See id. (conjecturing that if Louboutin is given trademark protection for his red
sole mark, other designers will stake out other shades of red, leading to absurd results).
89. See In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1792 (T.T.A.B.
2013) (rejecting the necessity of a complete analysis under the doctrine of secondary
meaning).
90. See Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., 679 F.3d 410, 418, 420
(6th Cir. 2012) (moving through the first two prongs of the test, and then applying the
competition theory of functionality and secondary meaning); Christian Louboutin v.
Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 223-227 (2d Cir. 2012)
(delineating the analysis between aesthetic functionality (including competition) and
secondary meaning).
91. See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 222, 226 (explaining that the six-part test is part of
the highly fact specific approach of identifying brand success within a market).
92. See Maker’s Mark Distillery, 679 F.3d at 413.
93. See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 227 (holding that Louboutin’s red shoes qualify for
trademark protection under the secondary meaning analysis).
94. See In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A.
1982) (emphasizing that functionality and secondary meaning must be analyzed
separately).
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On the contrary, a mark that is functional can still obtain trademark
protection if it has acquired secondary meaning.95 In FTD, the TTAB
excused itself from completing a full secondary meaning analysis on the
basis that black was functional under the competition prong of the aesthetic
functionality test.96 Failing to conduct this stage of analysis was a
misapplication of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality because it ignored
the fact that a functional feature can still be trademarked if it is significant
enough to identify the product brand.97 Instead of looking at advertising
expenses, consumer studies, media coverage, sales figures, attempts at
plagiarism, and the length of time the mark had been used, the TTAB
merely looked at six statements from FTD’s Senior Vice President of
Marketing to dispel the notion that the company’s black floral packaging
was in any way distinct.98 While the evidentiary statements did include
total sales figures, there was no mention of the other five factors pertinent
to determining secondary meaning.99 Instead, the TTAB looked at the
number of times the FTD website had been visited after the introduction of
the black floral packaging, and then after a targeted advertising campaign
was implemented; in addition, the TTAB looked at the mere fact that FTD
advertised the black floral packaging in direct mailings.100 Conversely, in
Louboutin, the record included extensive evidence of Louboutin’s
advertising expenditures, media coverage, and sales successes, as well as
statements from the fashion world attesting to Louboutin’s uniqueness.101
As compared to Louboutin, the record in FTD was dearth of the factors
pertinent to a fair analysis of meaning behind the black floral packaging.102
However, even if one could argue that the TTAB was correct in stopping
short of a full secondary meaning analysis, the Sixth Circuit still carried out
95. See id. (explaining that a non-distinctive design does not necessarily mean it is
a functional design).
96. See In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1792 (T.T.A.B.
2013) (concluding that because applicant did not refute a prima facie case of
functionality it is not necessary to conduct a full secondary meaning analysis).
97. See In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d at 1343 (noting that it was
incorrect to refer to an object as indistinct because of its overall functionality).
98. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1792 (considering only six statements submitted in
2011 by Larry Plawsky, Senior Vice President of Marketing at FTD).
99. See id.
100. See id. (noting that the FTD website was visited 350 million times after the
introduction of the black floral packaging, and nine million times after the advertising
campaign was initiated).
101. See Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 227 (2d Cir. 2012) (including statements from the Chief Executive Officer of
YSL, Louboutin’s competitor, acknowledging the notoriety of the red sole mark).
102. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1792.
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its analysis under the competition prong of the aesthetic functionality
doctrine poorly.103
B. In FTD the TTAB Erred In Its Analysis Because It Did Not Apply the
Four-Part Test for Trademark Color Infringement.
In FTD, the TTAB erroneously chose not to fully analyze the color black
under all four prongs of the four-part test.104 The TTAB failed to identify
the market that FTD was competing in and therefore made it impossible to
satisfactorily evaluate the competitive need for the color black.105
Furthermore, in choosing not to engage in a full secondary meaning
analysis under the six-factor test, the TTAB never fully dispelled the
possibility that black could be trademarked.106 Accordingly, when the
TTAB in FTD decided that there was a competitive need for the color
black, and stopped short of a full secondary meaning analysis, it incorrectly
labeled the color black as functional.107
1. Because the TTAB in the FTD Case Did Not Clearly Identify the Market
FTD Was Competing In, It Erred In Identifying the Color Black As
Functional.
To the extent that functionality is determined by competitive need, courts
will always have to engage in market definition because the question of
whether exclusive use over a design element, including color, puts
competitors at a disadvantage is always based on the nature of the market
in which the parties compete.108 In evaluating the competition, the TTAB
did not narrowly construe the market in the FTD case.109 Courts, however,
have traditionally favored preserving competition within narrowly
construed markets.110
103. See generally Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d
410, 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (analyzing competitive necessity under the Frisch test).
104. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1792 (explaining that there is a presumption of nonfunctionality under the first two prongs of the test and that a finding of functionality
precludes registration without regard to secondary meaning).
105. See id. at 1792.
106. See id.
107. See In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1791
(T.T.A.B. 2013) (laying out its road map, the TTAB bases its analysis on whether
protecting the color black would hinder competition).
108. See Mark McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 830 (2011)
(explaining that market definition can be difficult because courts have never been able
to develop a methodology for defining relevant markets in functionality cases).
109. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1789 (applying the market analysis to not only black
floral packaging but all parts of the floral industry, such as containers and flowers).
110. See McKenna, supra note 108, at 832 (explaining that while the narrow
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Prior to the FTD case, courts focused on the issue of competitive need in
determining whether a single color can be registered as a trademark.111 In
British Seagull, the TTAB stated that the color black could not be
trademarked because it was needed for aesthetic reasons on outboard boat
engines; color compatibility with boats and the ability to make the engine
look smaller.112 In other words, it would be unfair to boat engine makers,
to grant exclusive use of the color black to one single company.113
Similarly, the Federal Circuit also addressed competitive need in L.D.
Kichler, in which the court held that using a brick finish on lighting fixtures
must be available to all lighting fixture producers.114
In Maker’s Mark, the Sixth Circuit limited its analysis to liquor bottles
using the seal, and did not include other food items, such as wines and
cheeses, which also often bear a red wax seal.115 Likewise, in Louboutin,
the Second Circuit limited its analysis to high-end shoes that contrasted
with the red sole, and excluded athletic shoes and monochromatic red
shoes.116 In both of these cases, the courts narrowly construed the market
to include only the relevant merchandise, but in FTD, the TTAB used an
overly broad market definition by including the entire floral industry
instead of just floral boxes.117
In Dippin Dots, the soft ice cream beads case, the Eleventh Circuit,
tightly grouped the merchandise.118 Accordingly, Dippin Dots’ beaded ice
construction may not be right, courts offer no other methodology for determining
relevant markets).
111. See generally British Seagull Ltd v. Brunswick Corp., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1197, 1197 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (describing applicant who sought to register the color
black for outboard engines).
112. See id. at 1199 (holding that based color was functional based on this
competitive need).
113. See id. (explaining that in the outboard engine market, black must be available
to all engine manufacturers so that they can compete with each other fairly).
114. See L.D. Kichler Co. v. Davoil, Inc., 192 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(stating that while it is clear that many people prefer Old Brick finish, it was not
established that Old Brick was uniquely superior to other brands).
115. See Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 415
(6th Cir. 2012) (discussing the history of bourbon and other liquors in its historical
market analysis).
116. See Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 228 (2d Cir. 2012) (failing to extend trademark protection to shoes in which the
red sole does not contrast with the rest of the shoe).
117. See In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1789
(T.T.A.B. 2013) (applying the purported mark, black floral packaging, to all parts of
the floral industry).
118. See Dippin Dots v. Frosty Bites, 369 F.3d 1197, 1209 (11th Cir. 2004)
(holding that Dippin Dots cannot claim trade dress infringement because Frosty Bites
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cream was considered distinct enough from soft serve ice cream to occupy
a different market.119 In FTD, the mark originally introduced for trademark
protection was black floral packaging, but the TTAB not only analyzed
packaging, but flowers and holiday containers as well.120 Broadly
construing the market, the TTAB argued that if FTD obtained a trademark
on black floral packaging then other florists would be precluded from using
the color black in floral bouquets and containers.121
Analyzing the market across such broad terms misinterprets the purpose
of trademark law.122 Trademark protection for a design feature, such as
color, does not create monopoly control over that feature for all uses.123
Even if, the TTAB awarded FTD trademark protection for its black floral
packaging, the color black could still be used; it simply could not be used
in a way that would cause consumer confusion in the floral market.124 With
that said, it is highly unlikely that a potential customer would be confused
by whether black floral packaging and black flowers were designed by the
same company, because even though both share a similarity in color, the
overall concepts are different.125 In the lower court’s decision in
Louboutin, Louboutin’s red sole mark was not eligible for trademark
protection in part because the district court believed that the implication of
approving the trademark would result in potentially overbroad
protection.126 On appeal, the Second Circuit resolved this concern when it

occupies a different market).
119. See id. at 1203-04 n.7 (explaining that there is little chance of consumer
confusion between beaded ice cream and soft serve ice cream).
120. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1790 (noting that black flowers can communicate
elegance and/or mourning).
121. See id. at 1789 (explaining that because black is a traditional Halloween color
it must be available for holiday bouquets and containers).
122. See Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 115 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that trademark law is less about innovation and more about preserving a
competitive market for the benefit of its customers).
123. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 640 n.10 (7th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that Kohler was free to copy Moen’s design so long as it insured that the
public was not deceived).
124. See Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 224 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that part of trademark regulation involves
providing enough differentiation to ensure that consumers are not confused).
125. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1789 (applying erroneously the purported mark, black
floral packaging, to all parts of the floral industry).
126. See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp.
2d. 445, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining that if Louboutin was allowed to trademark a
single color there would be no end to the colors that people would attempt to
trademark, particularly in fashion).
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concluded that the protection did not extend to all red shoes and permitted
YSL to produce a monochromatic red shoe.127 The court was so particular
in its market analysis that it limited the merchandise in question to shoes
consisting of red soles and a contrasting color, which is not at all what the
TTAB did in FTD.128 In FTD, the TTAB even seemed confused by
whether the purported mark included black flowers or just a black box.129
The black floral packaging had nothing to do with the flowers, but rather it
only dealt with the color of the box in which FTD packaged and delivered
the flowers.130 Furthermore, even when the TTAB did focus on packaging,
it was not particular in distinguishing a black floral cardboard box from
black vases and non-perishable black containers.131 In Dippin Dots, the
court’s analysis exemplified how narrowly market analysis is generally
construed.132 If beaded ice cream and soft serve ice cream are in different
markets, then certainly a black box is different from black flowers and
vases.133 Without offering a compelling reason to broaden the market
beyond floral packaging, the TTAB failed to establish the competitive
necessity of the color black in the floral industry and thus did not establish
its functionality under the aesthetic functionality doctrine.134
2. Because the TTAB Did Not Apply the Six-Factor Test Outlined In
Louboutin, It Did Not Fully Engage In a Secondary Meaning Analysis.
The TTAB did not apply the test for secondary meaning in the FTD case
correctly because it ignored several of the six factors involved in a true
secondary meaning analysis.135 A fact-specific inquiry into the nature of
the trademark is required when the secondary meaning analysis is

127. See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 227 (concluding that the trademark protection does
not extend to all red shoes).
128. See id. (noting that Louboutin’s mark is as much about color as it is about
contrast).
129. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1789 (including in the record evidence that the color of
flowers communicate particular messages).
130. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1789 (explaining that this issue for consideration is
whether trademarking the color black for flower boxes would hinder competition).
131. See id. at 1791.
132. See Dippin Dots v. Frosty Bites, 369 F.3d 1197, 1207 (11th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that there is little chance of confusing ice cream beads and soft serve ice
cream, so they occupy two different markets).
133. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1788-89 (describing the purported mark as black
cardboard packaging, which does not include flowers and vases).
134. See Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 419
(6th Cir. 2012) (applying the Frisch test to competitive necessity).
135. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1792-93.
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applied.136 The six-factor test for determining secondary meaning
considers: advertising expenditures; consumer study reports; product sales
revenue; attempts at plagiarism; and the length of time the mark has been in
use.137 In FTD the only factors the TTAB observed in this six-part test was
noting the length of time the mark had been in use and its sales figures.138
Returning once more to Maker’s Mark, the Sixth Circuit engaged in a much
deeper analysis when it explained the secondary meaning behind the red
wax seal.139 The court not only looked at the company’s extensive
marketing campaign, but also the public attention that the brand received
through the media.140 Similarly, in Louboutin, the Second Circuit not only
analyzed Louboutin’s advertising expenditures, media coverage, and sales
success, but also admitted testimony that the red sole mark was instantly
recognizable in high-end commercial markets and social circles.141 In
FTD, the TTAB’s failure to address almost all of the necessary factors
under the fourth part of the four-part test for color trademark resulted in the
erroneous determination that black floral packaging was not distinct
enough to identify FTD.142 Rather than applying the six-factor test for
secondary meaning, the TTAB denied a finding of secondary meaning
solely on the basis that FTD had placed the floral packaging into commerce
two years ago, sold 1.8 million arrangements, and promoted its product
through the Internet and direct mailings.143 Furthermore, in its request for
reconsideration, FTD asked the TTAB to review statements from
consumers, but the examiners declined to consider them because they were
submitted as form statements.144 In both Maker’s Mark and Louboutin, the
136. See Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 222 (2d
Cir. 2012) (noting that courts must balance the trademark owner’s rights to enjoy the
benefits of her mark, and the public’s rights to a competitive market).
137. See id. at 226 (noting that the six factors help answer the question whether the
public buys a product because of its brand, which is a crucial element in secondary
meaning analysis).
138. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1792 (stating that the black box mark had been on the
market for at least two years).
139. See Maker’s Mark Distillery, 679 F.3d at 420-21 (holding that the red wax seal
was part of Maker’ identity).
140. See id. at 420 (noting the strong presence of the mark in Maker’s advertising).
141. See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 225 (quoting YSL’s chief executive officer that
“[i]n the fashion or luxury world, it is absolutely clear that we recognize the notoriety
of the distinctive signature constitute by the red sole of Louboutin).
142. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1792 (holding that the black floral packaging was
functional and failed to acquire secondary meaning).
143. See id. at 1792-93.
144. See id. at 1793 n.9 (explaining that while form statements may be used to show
secondary meaning they have many shortcomings).
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courts thoroughly reviewed advertising expenditures, media coverage, and
sales successes to demonstrate that both companies had created a unique
trademark using color.145
Further, it is notable that in Maker’s Mark, the Sixth Circuit laid out a
fairly complicated, but thorough test for assessing competitive need.146 The
first part of the two-part test was whether rendering trademark protection
for a design feature, including color, would leave competitors with
alternative designs.147 The second part of the test was whether trademark
protection would prevent another manufacturer from competing in the same
market.148 In Louboutin, the Second Circuit focused less on the
competition prong of functionality.149 Conversely, in FTD, the TTAB fully
engaged in a competitive functionality analysis, but in broadly construing
the market it wrongfully applied the test to all of the floral industry, and not
just black in the context of floral packaging.150
C. In FTD the TTAB Erred In Its Analysis Because It Directly Contradicted
the Supreme Court’s Holding in Qualitex.
In FTD, the TTAB stated that color can never be inherently
distinctive.151 Even if this statement was supported in the Qualitex decision
at the TTAB level, this decision was later appealed to the Supreme
Court.152 In a unanimous decision, the Court held that nothing precludes
color from receiving trademark protection.153 Both Louboutin and Maker’s
145. See, e.g., Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 225 (noting that Louboutin had invested a
substantial amount of money in building a reputation and promoting its exclusive
ownership of the mark).
146. See Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 418
(6th Cir. 2012) (explaining that under the competition theory of functionality the Sixth
Circuit considers two different tests).
147. See id. (explaining that if alternative designs are not available the feature is
functional).
148. See id. (explaining if such a barrier is probable, the feature is likely
functional).
149. See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 227 (finding secondary meaning to be the crux of
the case).
150. See In Re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1791 (T.T.A.B.
2013) (applying its analysis to several parts of the floral industry, including holiday
containers and flowers).
151. See id. at 1793 n.6 (citing the Qualitex TTAB decision which originally
prohibited single color registration).
152. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995)
(reversing on appeal the Ninth Circuit’s decision that color alone cannot be registered
as a trademark).
153. See id. at 164 (holding that color may sometimes meet the basic legal
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Mark followed the Qualitex precedent, and so it is unclear why the TTAB
did not follow the decisions in these recent cases.154 The TTAB’s
statement that color cannot have secondary meaning contradicted the
Supreme Court precedent in Qualitex where the court held that color can
identify a product and serve something other than a functional purpose.155
Addtionally, even without the Qualitex decision, courts have repeatedly
shown a tendency to support the notion that color in the right context has
just as much capacity to identify a brand as words or logos.156 Long before,
Qualitex, in Yellow Cab Transit v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer, the Sixth
Circuit recognized that the yellow on taxicabs was distinct enough to be
given some trademark protection.157 Likewise, in In re Owens-Corning
Fiberglass, ten years before Qualitex, the Federal Circuit allowed the
insulation company to trademark the pink color of its insulation product.158
Finally, in British Seagull Limited v. Brunswick, another TTAB case
decided two years before Qualitex, the court considered whether black
could be trademarked, and it once again clarified that acquired secondary
meaning is possible for colors.159 Given this context, the TTAB’s posture
towards color trademarking in FTD was both misguided and historically
inaccurate.160
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
It has been almost two decades since the Supreme Court weighed in on
color trademarks. Although the contexts in which color can qualify for
trademark protection is still unclear, there are two persuasive policy
requirements for use as a trademark).
154. See Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc. 679 F.3d 410, 421
(6th Cir. 2012) (holding that red in the red wax seal is protected); Louboutin, 696 F.3d
at 213 (holding that the color red on the bottom of Louboutin’s shoes can be protected).
155. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166 (explaining that color alone in some instances
can meet the basic legal requirements for use as a trademark).
156. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 147
F.2d 407, 415 (6th Cir. 1945) (holding that the yellow color on taxicabs had acquired
secondary meaning).
157. See id. at 411 (holding that defendant was precluded from using Yellow Cab
Transit’s distinctive “yellow scheme.”).
158. See In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1120 (Fed Cir.
1985) (noting that under the language of the Lanham Act color marks are not precluded
from registration).
159. See British Seagull Ltd. v. Brunswick Corp., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197, 1200
(T.T.A.B. 1993) (explaining that because color is not inherently distinctive there must
be a showing of secondary meaning).
160. See, e.g., In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d at 1120 (explaining
that the Lanham Act explicitly allows for color trademarks).
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arguments that support the notion that the continued use of the four-part
test should be encouraged.161 First, it appears to provide a systematic way
to evaluate color for trademark protection regardless of industry.162
Second, because the Supreme Court has not provided a test for determining
whether color can be trademarked, the four-part test is the best tool
available to resolve this question.163 Accordingly, the TTAB should have
more stringently applied this test, and in not doing so, failed to offer much
needed guidance on the circumstances when color can be trademarked.164
A. The Continued Application Of The Four-Part Test Provides A
Systematic Way To Assess Color For Trademark Protection.
With the Sixth and Second Circuits similar application of the doctrines
of aesthetic functionality, competition, and secondary meaning in Maker’s
Mark and Louboutin, the court showed a clear inclination towards the
adoption of a four-part test.165 Since courts have differing views on the
purpose of the aesthetic functionality doctrine, synthesizing the prongs of
these differing doctrines into one four-part standard eliminates
confusion.166 For instance, even in the similar Louboutin and Maker’s
Mark cases, the courts analyzed competition according to two different
subtests.167 If the courts continue to ignore the four-part test like it did in
FTD, then confusion surrounding when color can be trademarked will
perpetuate.168
161. See McKenna, supra note 108, at 824 (stating that courts do not understand the
aesthetic functionality doctrine).
162. Compare Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410,
414 (6th Cir. 2012) (evaluating whether a purported mark in the bourbon industry
renders trademark protection), with Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am.
Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 2012) (evaluating whether a single color in
the fashion industry renders trademark protection).
163. See McKenna, supra note 108, at 824 (stating that courts have different views
on the purpose of the aesthetic functionality doctrine).
164. See id. at 860 (stating that in evaluating trademarks under the aesthetic
functionality doctrine there is “much work [improvement] to be done.”).
165. See, e.g., Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 227 (holding that the case turns on secondary
meaning).
166. See McKenna, supra note 108 at 823 (explaining that the use of the aesthetic
functionality doctrine in case law is “scattered” with some courts refusing to recognize
the doctrine, and others being reluctant to find any features aesthetically functional).
167. See Maker’s Mark Distillery, 679 F.3d at 419 (applying the Frisch Test to
analyze competition); Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 221 (asking only whether trademark
protection would hinder competition by limiting the range of adequate alternative
designs).
168. See McKenna, supra note 108, at 824 (highlighting the lack of consensus
between courts on aesthetic functionality and trademark law).
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Further, the FTD case made it easier to ignore secondary meaning, which
is really the crux of color analysis.169 Instead of looking comprehensively
at all four factors under the four-part test, the TTAB presumed that if color
is functional then it cannot have secondary meaning.170 Because of the lack
of standardization in evaluating color trademarks, courts need a test that
can be used across industries. Establishing a set evaluative norm will
eliminate further confusion, and this can be accomplished through the use
and standardization of the four-part test.171
B. Because Of the Lack Of Guidance From the Supreme Court On Color
Trademarks, Courts Must More Stringently Apply The Four-Part Test.
Concurring in FTD, Judge Bucher expressed support for the majority
decision, but ardently noted that the majority opinion should have delved
further into competitive necessity.172 Further, Judge Bucher also engaged
in a deeper analysis of secondary meaning and rooted his concurrence in
the notion that examining attorneys should exercise caution when using the
term aesthetic functionality in light of historical confusion.173 Highlighting
that standardization in color trademarking is desperately needed, Judge
Buchner proposed another test for color analysis: a bifurcated approach.174
In introducing this alternative, Judge Bucher’s concurrence emphasized
that the majority did not fully analyze the facts according to whether the
color black affects the purpose, price, competitive market for, and overall
meaning of the product.175

169. See In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1792 (T.T.A.B.
2013) (concluding that a finding of functionality precludes registration).
170. See id. at n.6 (stating “[a]lthough trade dress may be inherently distinctive,
color can never be.”).
171. See McKenna, supra note 108, at 860 (explaining that we cannot expect the
aesthetic functionality doctrine to work in application without a better understanding of
trademark law and competition.
172. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 32 n.13 (T.T.A.B. 2013) (Bucher, J., concurring).
173. See id. at 1794 (discussing why trademark examiners should be cautious in
applying aesthetic functionality).
174. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1795 (Bucher, J., concurring) (noting that his bifurcated
approach is consistent with the latest version of the Trademark Manual for Examining
Procedures).
175. See Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 228 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that Louboutin’s red sole mark can be trademarked on
the basis of secondary meaning); Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., 679
F.3d 410, 424 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that because there is no competitive need for red
wax, the Maker’s Mark red wax seal can be trademarked).
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V. CONCLUSION
The question of under what circumstances can color be trademarked
remains unanswered, but the decisions in Maker’s Mark and Louboutin
introduce the possibility that when a color on a product satisfies the fourpart test—encompassing the doctrines of functionality, competition, and
secondary meaning— it can be trademarked.176 The pertinent elements of
the test include whether the color: (1) affects the purpose of the product; (2)
affects the use of the product; (3) significantly impacts competition; and (4)
has secondary meaning.177 Further, the elements for determining whether a
design feature, including color, has secondary meaning are: (1) advertising
expenses; (2) consumer studies linking the color to the source of the
product; (3) media coverage of the product; (4) sales success of the
product; (5) attempts at plagiarism; and (6) length of time the color has
been used to identify the source of the product.178 However, due to the
TTAB’s poor application of these tests in FTD, this Comment argued that
courts have a responsibility to more stringently apply all portions of the
four-part test in such a way that is consistent with the Maker’s Mark and
Louboutin cases.179 Furthermore, because the question remains unresolved
of whether the four-part test is the best method for color analysis, it is time
for the Supreme Court to expand upon its decision in Qualitex and set
specific guidelines for determining when color can be trademarked.180
At the very least, the analysis in FTD, must be revisited as a showing of
functionality was not shown, and a complete analysis under the secondary
meaning doctrine was never executed.181 Ultimately, this Comment argued
that the court should reexamine the FTD case and fully analyze the color
black in such a way that is consistent with the Maker’s Mark and Louboutin

176. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995).
177. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170 (examining whether color that serves a non-

functional purpose interferes with market competition); Inwood Labs v. Ives Labs., 456
U.S. 844, 856-57 (1952) (examining whether mislabeling a generic drug with the brand
name affects whether people use and purchase it); Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 224
(asserting that color is capable of acquiring a secondary meaning and identifying the
brand name).
178. See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 228; Maker’s Mark Distillery, 679 F.3d at 424.
179. See In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1785, 1788,
1790-91 (T.T.A.B. 2013) (misapplying the competition and secondary meaning prongs
of the four-part test the TTAB finds a showing of functionality).
180. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166 (concluding only that sometimes color can meet
the basic legal requirements for trademark protection).
181. See 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1789 (describing how the misapplication of the fourpart test resulted in a showing of aesthetic functionality without considering a
secondary meaning analysis).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014

25

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 7

1006

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 22:4

analyses.182 Such a reexamination should concentrate on whether the color
black affects: the purpose and price of the floral packaging; the market for
flower boxes; and the acquired character of the packaging.183 Further, this
Comment suggested that courts should begin to consistently analyze color
trademarks according to the four-part test because it is the most recent,
clear, and systematic analysis available.184
In Qualitex, the majority opinion made it clear that:
[O]ver time, customers may come to treat a particular color on a product
or its packaging (say, a color that in the context seems unusual, such as
pink on a firm’s insulating material or red on the head of a large
industrial bolt) as signifying a brand. And, if so, that color would have
come to identify and distinguish the goods . . . much in the way that
descriptive words on a product . . . can come to indicate a product’s
origin.185

Accordingly, now it is time to ensure that the circumstances under which
such colors can be trademarked are clarified and standardized.186

182.
183.
184.
185.

See, e.g., Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 228.
See id. at 224.
See id. at 206.
See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163 (quoting dicta from J. Breyer’s majority opinion
supporting the proposition that color can be trademarked).
186. See id. at 166.
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